The inside story of how India’s post-Pulwama coercive diplomacy spooked Pakistan, forcing it to rethink its terror policy
With 9 Indian missiles apparently pointed at Pakistan, ready to be unleashed any moment, a spooked Pakistan government knocked at midnight on the doors of then Indian high commissioner Ajay Bisaria to defuse the situation by facilitating a conversation that its prime minister, Imran Khan, wanted to have with PM Narendra Modi.
The night in question, described later by Modi himself as the qatal ki raat (night of bloodshed), was the night of February 27, 2019, the first of the two that the captured Indian wing commander, Abhinandan Varthaman, spent in Pakistan’s custody after the India-Pakistan aerial dogfight earlier in the day. Events that night have been the subject of much speculation, but Bisaria himself pieces together granular details of developments after the pilot was taken captive in a scintillating account of India’s coercive diplomacy, which led to Abhinandan’s release 2 days later, in his upcoming book Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship Between India and Pakistan.
Bisaria reveals that he got a call at midnight from then Pakistan high commissioner to India Sohail Mahmood, then in Islamabad, who said Khan was keen to talk to Modi. Bisaria checked with people in Delhi and got back to Mahmood, saying Modi wasn’t available at that hour and that any urgent message could be conveyed to the high commissioner himself. Bisaria didn’t hear from Mahmood again that night.
The next day, on February 28, Khan said in Parliament, while announcing Pakistan’s decision to release Abhinandan, he had tried calling Modi in the interest of peace but elaborated no further. Pakistan called the release of the mustachioed Indian fighter pilot a peace gesture, but to the Western diplomats, including the US and UK envoys to India and Pakistan who impressed on Islamabad how serious was India’s threat to escalate the situation if the pilot was harmed, Pakistan seemed “genuinely spooked”. Pakistan had summoned some of these diplomats thrice in rapid succession after the events of February 26.
A few of these envoys called India’s foreign secretary overnight to convey that Pakistan was ready to not just release Abhinandan but also act on India’s Pulwama dossier and address the issue of terrorism. They told him that Khan would make these announcements in Parliament the next day. According to Bisaria, the US and UK envoys were dismissive of Pakistan’s claim that it was a “false flag” operation in their conversations with DG ISI Asim Munir (present army chief) and foreign secretary Tehmina Janjua, saying it was a familiar denial practised by Islamabad even after 9/11 and Mumbai, Pathankot and Uri attacks. They also conveyed India’s “hard messages” to not just Pakistan diplomats but also to GHQ, Rawalpindi.
“India’s coercive diplomacy had been effective, India’s expectations of Pakistan and of the world had been clear, backed by a credible resolve to escalate the crisis,” says Bisaria. The book also discloses how a close friend of Khan had approached Bisaria for a “brief handshake and conversation” between Khan and Modi in Bishkek, on the margins of the SCO summit, that would have allowed the Pakistan PM to convince Modi of his “sincerity” in dealing with terrorism.
Hinting at kinetic military action, Modi had told an election rally in 2019 that Pakistan fortunately released the pilot or else it would have been a qatal ki raat.
India never officially said it aimed missiles at Pakistan to secure Abhinandan’s release but Bisaria reveals how the threat unnerved the army and Khan’s government. Janjua had summoned on February 27 the US, UK and French envoys to discuss India’s demands after Abhinandan was captured. In the middle of the meeting, around 5.45 pm, Janjua paused the conversation to read out a message from the army that India had 9 missiles pointed at Pakistan, to be launched any time that day. She asked the envoys to report this “credible information” to their capitals and to impress on India to not escalate. One of these envoys asked her to take it up directly with India, shortly after which the Indian acting high commissioner was also summoned. This was followed of course by Khan’s efforts to reach out to Modi.
A Western diplomat later told Bisaria that India’s actions seemed to have triggered a rethink by Pakistan on the efficacy of deploying proxy terror against India, with army chief Qamar Bajwa promising action to Western diplomats even on the Pulwama dossier prepared by India. The army, in fact, was telling its Western confidants that this was another APS moment, referring to the killing of 145 children in the Army Public School in Peshawar in 2015.
The most significant piece of evidence about Pakistan’s seriousness came in the form of a phone call to Bisaria at 2 am, a few months later, by a contact close to ISI who alerted the Indian high commissioner about an imminent attack by Al Qaeda to avenge the killing of its operative Zakir Musa. The ISI under Munir was apparently keen to not just discuss it at the military level but also wanted it escalated to the high commissioner to pass it on to the Indian government. That it was a genuine tip-off was evident when a attack did take place around the predicted time and place. Bisaria concludes that the input was either a result of Pakistan not wanting another Pulwama or Bajwa working to improve the atmospherics ahead of the SCO Bishkek summit in June that year.
According to Bisaria, who was expelled after India revoked the special status of J&K in August 2019, it was Khan’s shrill and personal rhetoric against India’s leadership that finally shut the door to diplomacy. The army under Bajwa apparently didn’t want the door shut entirely.
The book also details talks within the Indian government that preceded the Balakot airstrikes. Bisaria had conveyed to both Modi and Sushma Swaraj, then foreign minister, that India’s diplomatic options in dealing with a terror attack like Pulwama were limited. While Swaraj told him some “tough” action was round the corner, army chief Bipin Rawat conveyed to him India’s retaliatory attack would be much bigger than the 2016 surgical strikes. Rawat agreed though that Bajwa was interested in peace with India but often let the ISI and Pakistan corps commanders, who were not happy with the Bajwa doctrine, set the agenda.
With 9 Indian missiles apparently pointed at Pakistan, ready to be unleashed any moment, a spooked Pakistan government knocked at midnight on the doors of then Indian high commissioner Ajay Bisaria to defuse the situation by facilitating a conversation that its prime minister, Imran Khan, wanted to have with PM Narendra Modi.
The night in question, described later by Modi himself as the qatal ki raat (night of bloodshed), was the night of February 27, 2019, the first of the two that the captured Indian wing commander, Abhinandan Varthaman, spent in Pakistan’s custody after the India-Pakistan aerial dogfight earlier in the day. Events that night have been the subject of much speculation, but Bisaria himself pieces together granular details of developments after the pilot was taken captive in a scintillating account of India’s coercive diplomacy, which led to Abhinandan’s release 2 days later, in his upcoming book Anger Management: The Troubled Diplomatic Relationship Between India and Pakistan.
Bisaria reveals that he got a call at midnight from then Pakistan high commissioner to India Sohail Mahmood, then in Islamabad, who said Khan was keen to talk to Modi. Bisaria checked with people in Delhi and got back to Mahmood, saying Modi wasn’t available at that hour and that any urgent message could be conveyed to the high commissioner himself. Bisaria didn’t hear from Mahmood again that night.
The next day, on February 28, Khan said in Parliament, while announcing Pakistan’s decision to release Abhinandan, he had tried calling Modi in the interest of peace but elaborated no further. Pakistan called the release of the mustachioed Indian fighter pilot a peace gesture, but to the Western diplomats, including the US and UK envoys to India and Pakistan who impressed on Islamabad how serious was India’s threat to escalate the situation if the pilot was harmed, Pakistan seemed “genuinely spooked”. Pakistan had summoned some of these diplomats thrice in rapid succession after the events of February 26.
A few of these envoys called India’s foreign secretary overnight to convey that Pakistan was ready to not just release Abhinandan but also act on India’s Pulwama dossier and address the issue of terrorism. They told him that Khan would make these announcements in Parliament the next day. According to Bisaria, the US and UK envoys were dismissive of Pakistan’s claim that it was a “false flag” operation in their conversations with DG ISI Asim Munir (present army chief) and foreign secretary Tehmina Janjua, saying it was a familiar denial practised by Islamabad even after 9/11 and Mumbai, Pathankot and Uri attacks. They also conveyed India’s “hard messages” to not just Pakistan diplomats but also to GHQ, Rawalpindi.
“India’s coercive diplomacy had been effective, India’s expectations of Pakistan and of the world had been clear, backed by a credible resolve to escalate the crisis,” says Bisaria. The book also discloses how a close friend of Khan had approached Bisaria for a “brief handshake and conversation” between Khan and Modi in Bishkek, on the margins of the SCO summit, that would have allowed the Pakistan PM to convince Modi of his “sincerity” in dealing with terrorism.
Hinting at kinetic military action, Modi had told an election rally in 2019 that Pakistan fortunately released the pilot or else it would have been a qatal ki raat.
India never officially said it aimed missiles at Pakistan to secure Abhinandan’s release but Bisaria reveals how the threat unnerved the army and Khan’s government. Janjua had summoned on February 27 the US, UK and French envoys to discuss India’s demands after Abhinandan was captured. In the middle of the meeting, around 5.45 pm, Janjua paused the conversation to read out a message from the army that India had 9 missiles pointed at Pakistan, to be launched any time that day. She asked the envoys to report this “credible information” to their capitals and to impress on India to not escalate. One of these envoys asked her to take it up directly with India, shortly after which the Indian acting high commissioner was also summoned. This was followed of course by Khan’s efforts to reach out to Modi.
A Western diplomat later told Bisaria that India’s actions seemed to have triggered a rethink by Pakistan on the efficacy of deploying proxy terror against India, with army chief Qamar Bajwa promising action to Western diplomats even on the Pulwama dossier prepared by India. The army, in fact, was telling its Western confidants that this was another APS moment, referring to the killing of 145 children in the Army Public School in Peshawar in 2015.
The most significant piece of evidence about Pakistan’s seriousness came in the form of a phone call to Bisaria at 2 am, a few months later, by a contact close to ISI who alerted the Indian high commissioner about an imminent attack by Al Qaeda to avenge the killing of its operative Zakir Musa. The ISI under Munir was apparently keen to not just discuss it at the military level but also wanted it escalated to the high commissioner to pass it on to the Indian government. That it was a genuine tip-off was evident when a attack did take place around the predicted time and place. Bisaria concludes that the input was either a result of Pakistan not wanting another Pulwama or Bajwa working to improve the atmospherics ahead of the SCO Bishkek summit in June that year.
According to Bisaria, who was expelled after India revoked the special status of J&K in August 2019, it was Khan’s shrill and personal rhetoric against India’s leadership that finally shut the door to diplomacy. The army under Bajwa apparently didn’t want the door shut entirely.
The book also details talks within the Indian government that preceded the Balakot airstrikes. Bisaria had conveyed to both Modi and Sushma Swaraj, then foreign minister, that India’s diplomatic options in dealing with a terror attack like Pulwama were limited. While Swaraj told him some “tough” action was round the corner, army chief Bipin Rawat conveyed to him India’s retaliatory attack would be much bigger than the 2016 surgical strikes. Rawat agreed though that Bajwa was interested in peace with India but often let the ISI and Pakistan corps commanders, who were not happy with the Bajwa doctrine, set the agenda.